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cosmetic standards to fresh fruit and vegetables in 3 
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 5 
Stephen D Porter*a, David S Reaya, Elizabeth Bombergb, Peter Higginsc 6 
 ABSTRACT 7 
The use of aesthetics for classifying and accepting fresh food for sale and consumption is 8 
built into food quality standards and regulations of the European Union. The food 9 
distribution sector in Europe and the UK is oligopolistic in nature; a small number of 10 
supermarket chains control a large market share. The influence of these ‘multiples’ 11 
enables them to impose additional proprietary ‘quality’ criteria. Produce that doesn’t 12 
meet these standards may be lost from the food supply chain, never seeing a supermarket 13 
shelf – it may not get past the supplier, or even leave the farm. Here, for the first time, we 14 
estimate the quantity of food loss and waste of fresh fruit and vegetables arising from 15 
cosmetic standards in Europe and UK, and its associated greenhouse gas (GHG) 16 
emissions. We find few direct measurements of such losses, resulting in large 17 
uncertainties for key commodities. In the context of these uncertainties, we estimate 18 
avoidable FLW from on-farm cosmetic grade-outs of up to 4,500 kt yr-1 in the UK and 19 
51,500 kt yr-1 in the European Economic Area (EEA). Our estimates suggest over a third 20 
of total farm production is lost for aesthetic reasons, which equates to as much as 970 kt 21 
CO2e (UK) and 22,500 kt CO2e (EEA) of embedded production-phase GHG emissions 22 
annually. Examining the issue from the perspective of markets, suppliers, and consumers 23 
we establish there is an over-emphasis on superficial qualities (i.e. cosmetic appearance) 24 
of fresh produce, which leads to its unnecessary loss and waste. Using an illustrative case 25 
study, we provide potential avenues to mitigate these losses and the associated GHG 26 
emissions. 27 
 28 
HIGHLIGHTS (3-5 bullets, max 85 characters per bullet) 29 
 Application of cosmetic standards has resulted in substantial avoidable food 30 
losses 31 
 Many actors across the agri-food chain enforce these standards upon farmers 32 
 The embedded emissions of lost sub-optimal food in the EEA is as much as 22.5 33 
Mt CO2e yr-1 34 
 Quantity of avoidable on-farm losses remains uncertain due to a lack of coverage 35 
 We propose several avenues to mitigate on-farm food loss and its embedded 36 
emissions 37 
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1. Introduction 49 
Food loss and waste (FLW) is one of the great scourges of our time. In excess of 10% of 50 
global population is chronically hungry (FAO et al., 2017, p. 5), yet we lose or waste about 51 
a third of all food meant for human consumption at some point in the food supply chain 52 
(FSC) (Gustavsson et al., 2011). Producing food accounts for 10-12% of global 53 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, primarily nitrous oxide (N2O) from crop production 54 
and methane (CH4) from meat and dairy production (Smith et al., 2014, pp. 822–824). 55 
Food waste alone may account for up to 16% of environmental impact of the agri-food 56 
chain (Scherhaufer et al., 2018). In addition to global food security and nutrition 57 
challenges, producing food that does not serve its purpose of feeding the populace has 58 
potentially avoidable climate-cost emissions embedded within it.  59 
There are many drivers of FLW, from the technological to the social (Canali et al., 2016). 60 
Amongst them in the agricultural production phase are ‘aesthetic imperfection’ and 61 
‘overplanting’ of produce (Parfitt et al., 2010; Teuber and Jensen, 2016, p. 34). These two 62 
drivers are linked – farmers must meet their contractual obligations to deliver specified 63 
tonnage of produce that meets particular standards (Beretta et al., 2013; Halloran et al., 64 
2014). A proportion of yield is expected not to meet cosmetic criteria and thus may not 65 
easily be sold, and possibly not even harvested (Garrone et al., 2014). Cosmetic 66 
requirements are an important component of ‘quality’ standards for fresh fruit and 67 
vegetables (FFV) – a greater number of prescribed elements apply to the appearance of 68 
FFV than to nutritional or food-safety characteristics (Porter et al., 2018). Produce 69 
deemed of too low a quality to enter the food supply chain may take several different non-70 
food routes. It is typically ploughed back into fields, composted, landfilled, used as animal 71 
feed, or as anaerobic digestion feedstock (Beretta et al., 2013; Jeannequin et al., 2015; 72 
Redlingshöfer et al., 2017). 73 
Reporting of on-farm FLW data by producers is not required by EU regulations – prior to 74 
harvest it is not considered to be food (European Parliament and Council, 2002, Art. 2). 75 
Discourse on food waste at the production stage has typically focused on accidental loss, 76 
such as from natural hazards and disease (Gille, 2012). In contrast, there is a dearth of 77 
studies quantifying avoidable food loss due to cosmetic standards and its embedded 78 
greenhouse gas emissions. Estimates at this life cycle stage are usually based upon a small 79 
number of studies carried out on just a few crops and applied to entire regions 80 
(Gustavsson et al., 2011), although others are more locally focused (Franke et al., 2016; 81 
Hartikainen et al., 2018). Some studies omit losses in the production phase entirely due 82 
to uncertainties (Monier et al., 2010). The few reported losses from failure to meet 83 
cosmetic criteria are wide and quite uncertain. The limited evidence of on-farm food 84 
losses due to aesthetics suggests upwards of 40% of harvested FFV produce can be lost 85 
from the food supply chain at this stage alone (Bloom, 2011, p. 96; Davis et al., 2011, p. 86 
19; Stuart, 2009, p. 102). Recently, a more focused investigation in Germany and the 87 
Netherlands, utilising farmer self-assessed losses due to cosmetics, confirmed anecdotal 88 
evidence that wastage varies greatly by product, with ‘typical’ levels of about 20% (de 89 
Hooge et al., 2018). 90 
Here, we extend the discourse by viewing food loss and its embedded GHG emissions 91 
through the lens of aesthetics. Cosmetics-centred ‘quality’ criteria derived from physical 92 
characteristics of attractiveness alone are imposed on many food producers by down-93 
stream actors (such as regulators, retailers, and consumers). These criteria may stem 94 
from in-built consumer preferences, with other actors reacting in response (EU FUSIONS, 95 
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2014). Produce that is excluded from the food supply chain (FSC) through not meeting 96 
such aesthetic ‘standards’ can be regarded as avoidable waste. Likewise, greenhouse gas 97 
emissions associated with the production of this wasted food can be deemed avoidable, 98 
with changes in aesthetic classifications having the potential for emissions mitigation. 99 
In the following, we provide what we believe to be the first estimation of production-100 
phase embedded emissions of fresh fruit and vegetables lost from the food supply chain 101 
due to application of cosmetic standards. We then argue a complex and interactive system 102 
exists that encourages food waste and is perpetuated by all actors in the typical agri-food 103 
chain. As we will show, these actors include governments (via regulations of minimum 104 
‘quality standards’), supermarket multiples (via the power to impose private voluntary 105 
standards), and consumers (via learned expectations). Finally, we supplement this 106 
analysis and argument with a case study of an atypical farming operation within the 107 
Central Belt of Scotland to illustrate potential pathways to prevent cosmetic standard-108 
driven FLW.  109 
2. Estimations of  EEA and UK grade-out losses and embedded 110 
emissions 111 
2.1 Methods 112 
The geographic areas of focus are the European Economic Area (EEA) and the UK. The 113 
EEA is comprised of the EU Member States as well as Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. 114 
These three countries are all members of the EU’s ‘single market’, and are thus bound by 115 
the same regulations on food produce as EU Member States. Only EEA and UK FFV crops 116 
with at least one published on-farm cosmetic grade-out loss factor (LF) and 117 
corresponding cradle-to-farm-gate emission factor (EF) are included in this analysis. The 118 
factors are taken from the underlying sources referred to by Porter et al. (2016), plus 119 
additional, more recent, sources from peer-reviewed literature and reputable grey-120 
literature sources. The keywords “carbon footprint” and “life cycle analysis” together 121 
with “UK” and “Europe” were used to search the Scopus, ScienceDirect and Web of 122 
Science databases for peer-reviewed emissions factors published since 2016. Citation 123 
tracking was subsequently used to identify potential grey literature using the same 124 
filtering criteria. In addition, the official French database of agriculture emissions, 125 
ADEME, (2017), was included. The resulting literature was further filtered to include only 126 
those with emissions factor data in CO2 for the production stage, or had sufficient detail 127 
included to make this conversion, for fresh fruit and vegetables. Full details of sources 128 
and values for both LF and EF variables are contained within Supplementary Information 129 
Tables 1 and 2. 130 
The estimates we used for regional EEA on-farm grade-out FFV loss factors (LFs) and 131 
their production-phase embedded emission factors (EFs) are crop-specific from any EEA 132 
country. In the UK, all but two crops have a country-specific LF; for pears and cabbages, 133 
the respective EEA factors are used as proxies. LFs may be reported as a range or as a 134 
single estimate; EFs are typically reported as a single point estimate. The absolute 135 
minimum and maximum estimates are identified for each crop’s LF and EF for the EEA 136 
and also within the UK sub-set. We also make a central estimate of the LF for each crop 137 
by averaging the mid-points of ranges and the single estimates. Alternatively, the central 138 
estimate of the EFs is an average of all reported estimates for each crop within the EEA 139 
as a whole and also for the UK specifically. We present these as ‘min’, ‘max’, and ‘central’ 140 
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in Section 2.2. Data for FFV production for the year 2016 was sourced from the eurostat 141 
(n.d.) database. Non-food use data was obtained from the United Nation’s Food and 142 
Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) Food Balance Sheet database (FAOSTAT, n.d.); see  143 
Table 1. 144 
We estimate the mass of on-farm cosmetic grade-out losses with the model shown in Eq 145 
1. We use the Eurostat database for FFV crop production in the EEA as a whole and the 146 
UK specifically. Most FFV crops have a single entry for Harvested Production; this value is 147 
used. However, tomatoes, apples, and pears, have two entries for Harvested Production. 148 
For these three crops, we use the quantity indicated as ‘for fresh consumption’ in the 149 
Eurostat database; cosmetic criteria are not applied to that proportion of these crops 150 
intended ‘for processing’ from the outset. FFV graded-out on-farm does not enter the food 151 
chain and therefore is not included in Harvested Production data (Redlingshöfer et al., 152 
2017). We adjust for this in the denominator term of Eq 1.  153 
Eq 1 154 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑠 = ∑ (
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑘 ∗ 𝐴𝐹𝑗,𝑘 ∗  𝐿𝐹𝑗,𝑘,𝑠
1 − 𝐿𝐹𝑗,𝑘,𝑠
) 155 
Where: Loss is the total food loss in scenario s from on-farm cosmetic grade-outs (in kt); 156 
Harvested Production is the mass (in kt) of food crop j in country k, (where k is either the 157 
UK or EEA); AF is the allocation factor of crop j in region k (Eq 2); LF is the loss factor (in 158 
%) for crop j, in country k, under scenario s (minimum, maximum, average).  159 
Some portion of a crop may be intended for seed or other use, but not recorded in 160 
Eurostat as such. To adjust for the non-food uses, we create a weighted-average allocation 161 
factor (AF) for each FFV crop. We use annual FAO data for the most recent five-year 162 
period available (2009-2013), as shown in Eq 2. The only FFV crop affected is potatoes – 163 
where the AF is calculated as 0.86 for the EEA and 0.88 for the UK. That is, 14% and 12% 164 
of the respective recorded harvests for the EEA and UK is not intended for human 165 
consumption and thus do not have cosmetic standards applied to them.  166 
Eq 2 167 
𝐴𝐹𝑘 = 1 − (
𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑘 + 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑘
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘
) 168 
Where, for crop j in region k (the EEA or UK) for the period 2009-2013:  AF is proportion 169 
of the FFV crop not intended for consumption by humans; Production is the amount of 170 
crop (in kt); Seed is the amount directly used to propagate a future harvest (in kt); and 171 
Other Uses is the amount intended for any other non-food purposes (in kt). 172 
Finally, we estimate the production-phase embedded emissions (Em) using the 173 
‘minimum, ‘maximum’, and ‘average’ peer-reviewed crop and region-specific cradle-to-174 
farm-gate emission factors (EFs) detailed previously. These factors are applied to the 175 
three grade-out Loss estimates (‘minimum, ‘maximum’, and ‘average’) from Eq 1 for each 176 
FFV crop in the EEA and UK (Eq 3). The result is a 3x3 scenario matrix of total EEA and 177 
UK, and specific FFV crop Em estimates. 178 
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Eq 3 179 
𝐸𝑚𝑗,𝑘,𝑠 = ∑ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑗,𝑘,𝑠 ∗  𝐸𝐹𝑗,𝑘,𝑠 180 
Where: Em is the quantity (in kt CO2e) of GHG emissions of crop j in country k for scenario 181 
s; Loss (in kt) is food loss for crop j in region k from Eq 1, and; EF is the emission factor 182 
(in kt CO2e kt-1) for crop j in country k for scenario s. Summary data is provided in Table 183 
1. 184 
 185 
Table 1. Summary of data used to estimate range of on-farm cosmetic grade-outs of FFV. Harvested Production for 186 
potatoes is adjusted for its allocation factor from Eq 2. Fully referenced tables for Loss Factors and Emissions Factors 187 
are provided in Supplementary Information (Tables SI1 and SI2). 188 
Crop Region 
Harvested 
Production 
(kt) 
Loss Factor 
(%) 
Emissions Factor  
(kt CO2e kt-1) 
Min Central Max Min Central Max 
Apple UK 208 5 15 25 0.11 0.21 0.32 
Europe 9,309 1 10 25 0.03 0.17 0.43 
Broccoli + 
Cauliflower 
UK 152 3 12 20 0.29 1.12 1.94 
Europe 2,341 3 12 20 0.29 1.26 2.22 
Cabbage UK 231 8 22 40 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Europe 3,821 8 22 40 0.22 0.35 0.48 
Carrot UK 724 24 31 50 0.05 0.20 0.35 
Europe 5,663 10 23 50 0.02 0.17 0.50 
Lettuce UK 107 5 26 50 1.00 1.39 1.78 
Europe 2,285 5 24 50 0.26 1.01 1.78 
Onion UK 390 9 15 20 0.07 0.22 0.37 
Europe 6,623 8 17 33 0.04 0.23 0.48 
Pear UK 24 10 11 12 0.32 0.32 0.32 
Europe 2,231 10 11 12 0.20 0.32 0.43 
Potato UK 4,888 3 19 40 0.17 0.22 0.26 
Europe 48,729 3 14 40 0.09 0.19 0.51 
Strawberry UK 118 1 12 35 0.80 0.94 1.27 
Europe 1,311 1 10 35 0.30 0.78 1.27 
Tomato UK 97 7 7 7 2.07 4.34 9.40 
Europe 6,969 1 3 7 0.11 1.59 9.40 
 189 
2.2 Results 190 
2.2.1 Cosmetic losses 191 
The Eurostat-recorded harvest quantity for FFV in the EEA and UK in 2016 is 89,300 kt 192 
and 6900 kt, respectively. Estimated on-farm grade-out losses of FFV in the EEA range 193 
from 3700 kt to 51,500 kt and from 470 kt to 4500 kt for the UK in 2016 (see 194 
Supplementary Information). Thus, the range of losses for cosmetic reasons is 4 – 58% 195 
and 7 – 65% of recorded Harvested Production in the EEA and UK, with an ‘central’ 196 
estimate of 17% and 25%. As indicated in Section 2.1, Harvested Production from the 197 
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Eurostat database does not include grade-out losses. Adding the losses back gives total 198 
actual FFV farm production intended for human consumption of 93,000 – 141,000 kt for 199 
the EEA, and 7400 – 11,500 kt for the UK. The estimated range of on-farm cosmetic grade-200 
out losses relative to total farm production in the EEA and UK is 4 – 37% and 6 – 39%, 201 
respectively, with a ‘central’ value of 14% for the EEA and 20% for the UK.  202 
In the UK, cosmetic grade-out losses are dominated by potatoes and carrots (Figure 1a). 203 
This is a function of their importance as an agricultural crop – potatoes were 70% of the 204 
UK FFV harvest by mass in 2016, whilst carrots were 10%. They also have higher 205 
minimum, maximum, and central cosmetic grade-out LFs relative to other crops. 206 
Together, these two crops account for 81 – 88% of grade-out losses by mass. This is 207 
equivalent to 380 – 4000 kt of losses, with a ‘central’ value of 1500 kt. Onions and 208 
cabbage, the third and fourth most important crop group for UK farming (just under 10% 209 
combined total), deliver just 6 – 13% of grade-out losses (250 – 880 kt, ‘central’ estimate 210 
of 390 kt). 211 
Total grade-out losses for FFV within the EEA are estimated to range from 3700 kt to 212 
51,500 kt. Similar to the UK, potatoes dominate cosmetic-related losses in the EEA, 213 
accounting for 41 – 63% of all grade-outs by mass (1500 – 32,500 kt, ‘central’ estimate of 214 
7900 kt) from 55% of recorded production volume. Carrots, onions, and brassicas, are 215 
key hotspots of grade-out losses in the remaining 45% of the harvest (Figure 1b). 216 
Together, these latter three crop groups account for FFV losses of 1600 kt – 12,100 kt 217 
(‘central’ value of 4400 kt), equivalent to 23 – 44% of EEA on-farm grade-out losses. (See 218 
Supplementary Information for details.) 219 
 220 
 221 
 222 
Figure 1. Grade-out losses (in kt) in 2016 in; a) the UK, and b) the EEA of the different FFV crops, applying the minimum, 223 
maximum, and ‘central’ LF estimates to recorded Harvested Production in Table 1 (i.e. the output of Eq 1). 224 
2.2.2 Embedded emissions of cosmetic losses 225 
Applying three EF values (minimum, maximum, and ‘central’ estimates) for each Loss 226 
scenario generates nine ‘scenarios’ of embedded production-phase GHG emissions. The 227 
absolute and proportional emissions of three scenarios for FFV in the UK and EEA are 228 
shown in Figure 2. They are the output of Eq 3 using the Min-Min, Central-Central, and 229 
Max-Max combination of Loss from Eq 1and EF values from Table 1. Relative importance 230 
of crops and their production-phase emissions is evident when comparing the UK with 231 
the EEA at large. Total embedded production-phase GHG emissions of food loss due to 232 
cosmetic criteria in the UK range from about 60 kt CO2e in a ‘minimum’ scenario to 970 233 
kt CO2e in a ‘maximum’ scenario, with a ‘central’ estimate of 380 kt CO2e. At the EEA level, 234 
total production-phase embedded GHG emissions range from about 340 kt CO2e to almost 235 
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22,500 kt CO2e, with an ‘central’ estimate of about 3600 kt CO2e (details of all scenarios 236 
are in Table SI 4). To put these latter figures in context, they are up to roughly 5% of the 237 
426,000 kt CO2e of GHG emissions attributed to the European agriculture sector in 2015 238 
(Eurostat, 2017). 239 
In the UK, the highest levels of embedded emissions from grade-out losses are from 240 
potatoes, carrots, and brassicas; together they account for 55 – 77% of the total. Potatoes 241 
have a relatively narrow range of UK-specific EF estimates (0.17 – 0.26 t CO2e t-1), 242 
typically at or near the lowest factor value for FFV crops. Even so, because of the high 243 
production volume and grade-out losses of potatoes, this crop is apportioned the highest 244 
level of embedded emissions. Our estimates of these emissions for the UK potato crop 245 
range from 25 to 510 kt CO2e, with a central estimate of 200 kt CO2e (or 19 – 67% of the 246 
total for the UK). Embedded emissions in grade-out losses of carrots and brassicas range 247 
from 14 – 210 kt CO2e, or 10 – 36% of the UK total. The range of absolute and 248 
proportionate emissions of carrots and brassicas reflects the higher level of uncertainty 249 
in the EF literature of these crops relative to others, particularly potatoes. 250 
Trends at the EEA region level are similar to those for the UK specifically. Potatoes are 251 
also the most important in terms of magnitude of embedded GHG emissions in all nine 252 
scenarios for the EEA. This one crop accounts for roughly one- to two-thirds of these 253 
emissions (or, 130 – 9900 kt CO2e) with a ‘central’ scenario estimate of 36% (1300 kt 254 
CO2e). Brassicas and root vegetables (carrots and onions) together account for 19 – 35% 255 
of embedded emissions (‘central’ of 30%), or 120 – 4200 kt CO2e (‘central’ estimate of 256 
1100 kt CO2e; see Supplementary Information for detailed breakdown by FFV crop). 257 
 258 
 259 
Figure 2. Production-phase embedded GHG emissions of grade-out losses by FFV (in kt CO2e) and as a proportion of 260 
total FFV by scenario for the UK (a, b) and the EEA (c, d). The three scenarios correspond to application of the Minimum, 261 
Central, and Maximum estimates of both the LF and EF variables from Table 2 (i.e. the Min scenario represents Min LF 262 
and Min EF). Details of all nine scenarios examined are contained within Table SI 4. 263 
0
250
500
750
1,000
1,250
Min Central Max
E
m
b
e
dd
e
d 
G
H
G
 E
m
is
si
on
s 
(k
t 
CO
2
e
) Tomato
Strawberry
Potato
Pear
Onion
Lettuce
Carrot
Cabbage
Broccoli +
Cauliflowera)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Min Central Max
Tomato
Strawberry
Potato
Pear
Onion
Lettuce
Carrot
Cabbage
Broccoli +
Cauliflower
b)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Min Central Max
Tomato
Strawberry
Potato
Pear
Onion
Lettuce
Carrot
Cabbage
Broccoli +
Cauliflowerd)
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
Min Central Max
E
m
be
d
de
d
 G
H
G
 E
m
is
si
o
ns
 (
kt
 C
O
2
e
) Tomato
Strawberry
Potato
Pear
Onion
Lettuce
Carrot
Cabbage
Broccoli +
Cauliflowerc)
  
9 
2.2.3 Limitations 264 
There is considerable uncertainty in these results, demonstrated by the range of our 265 
estimates for absolute FFV losses at farm-level and their respective embedded emissions. 266 
We have assumed that studies on these loss factors conducted on a particular crop in one 267 
country within the EEA are relevant to the same crop in another country. There is a very 268 
limited amount of data currently available on FFV loss factors at farm level. A further 269 
significant assumption in our results is that all grade-out food losses have left the agri-270 
food chain for destinations such as composting or ploughing-in and are therefore 271 
considered waste whose embedded emissions should be accounted for. There is no 272 
discernible consensus on what proportion of cosmetic losses of FFV would have another 273 
food-related use (such as animal feed, or used in further food processing). Porter et al. 274 
(2018) reports that within the EU under the current Common Agriculture Policy, 275 
approximately two-thirds of safe, edible FFV withdrawn from market after harvest is 276 
destroyed. de Hooge et al. (2018) states ploughing in, animal feed, and anaerobic 277 
digestion were the most common destinations, and that few of their interviewees 278 
mentioned selling a lower class product was a viable option. Redlingshöfer et al. (2017) 279 
indicates reuse plays a moderate role, but estimates an destruction rate greater than 80% 280 
for even the crop most commonly redirected to animal feed (i.e. potatoes). Terry et al. 281 
(2013, 2011) indicate the destination of grade-outs depends heavily on the crop, with 282 
ploughing-in the common destination for lettuce, tomato, and strawberry, whereas 283 
potato typically goes to animal feed or compost. Jeannequin et al. (2015) and Meyer et al. 284 
(2017) argue that field-graded produce, whether picked by hand or mechanised, is simply 285 
ploughed-in, but post-harvest graded produce is more likely to be redirected to another 286 
food use.  287 
Embedded emissions calculations rely estimates of UK- and Europe-specific emissions 288 
factors for fruit and vegetable published between 2000 and 2018. Coverage of food 289 
commodities in this literature was variable and sometimes seemingly dated (the oldest 290 
source is from 2006). For example, UK cabbage and pear have one EF estimate each (from 291 
2009) whereas there are more than a dozen from 1998-2018 for EEA tomatoes (see Table 292 
SI 2).  A review of the LCA literature by Clune et al., (2017) highlighted the considerable 293 
variability in such estimates across food group and showed activity in this area dropping 294 
considerably by 2015 relative to the seven years prior. This is consistent with the results 295 
of our own literature review – little data, and with considerable variation. It also 296 
demonstrates continued, more localised research on greenhouse gas emissions of food 297 
across its full life cycle is warranted by the wider community. 298 
3. An over-emphasis on superficial qualities (i.e. cosmetic 299 
appearance) of fresh produce 300 
In the following we present arguments for why FFV loss and waste from aesthetic 301 
standards – as estimated in the previous section – may occur. 302 
3.1 Waste encouraged by current marketing standards & regulations  303 
Food safety and food quality are treated separately within EU Regulations, with safety 304 
paramount. Article 14(1) of the General Requirements of Food Law states “food shall not 305 
be placed on the market if it is unsafe” (European Parliament and Council, 2002). 306 
However, it may be that food safety laws are overly strict, thus creating unnecessary 307 
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inefficiency in the food supply chain (Aschemann-Witzel, 2016). As a result, only fresh 308 
produce that is deemed safe for human consumption is subject to ‘quality’ standards. 309 
Fresh produce has natural variability in terms of size, colour, and shape; cosmetic 310 
appearance is not uniform. The EU’s Common Market Organisation (CMO) regulations 311 
specify particular requirements for different types of fresh produce to grade them (in 312 
ascending order) as Class II, Class I, or Extra Class (European Commission, 2011, Annex 313 
I, Part B). EU Member States may permit unclassed fresh produce to be sold in retail 314 
outlets provided it is clearly labelled as ‘for home processing’ or similar (Defra, 2017). 315 
This regulation implies fresh produce that does not meet arbitrary cosmetic 316 
requirements is not fit for consumption in its natural form. 317 
These EU-level marketing standards codify a common set of minimum acceptable criteria 318 
across EU Member States which, together with the EU CAP reforms of 2013, are intended 319 
to improve the competitiveness of international trade of agricultural produce of those 320 
States (DG-AGRI, 2013). For example, it is easier to pack and ship produce of standard, 321 
versus varying, proportions. The relative efficiency of the stages between the farm-gate 322 
and the consumer would appear to support this preference. Loss rates for fruit and 323 
vegetables in Europe at the handling and storage, processing, and distribution stages 324 
range from 2-7%, between a tenth and a third of the 20% estimated pre-farm-gate loss 325 
rate (Porter et al. 2016, Table SI 1). 326 
3.2 Waste currently endorsed (and ‘gold-plated’) by retailers 327 
The evidence that sub-optimal (‘imperfect’/’ugly’) produce won’t sell is inconclusive. De 328 
Hooge et al. (2017) provides support for the claim. Their choice modelling survey 329 
reported a clear preference to ‘optimal’ foods whether in the home or supermarket. Much 330 
variability remains unexplained, but that ‘beauty is good’ seemed to apply to foodstuffs. 331 
At least in an artificial, online environment a price discount was required to equalise 332 
optimal and sub-optimal choice preference. In contrast, Aschemann-Witzel et al. (2017) 333 
states that ‘quality’ is linked primarily to characteristics such as taste, nutritional quality, 334 
and food safety. As we stated in Section 3.1, EU CMO marketing standards only specifically 335 
consider the latter. Whilst urban consumers in developing and developed countries (i.e. 336 
China and Denmark) may share a preference for ‘perfect’ produce (Loebnitz et al., 2015; 337 
Loebnitz and Grunert, 2015), only ‘extremely abnormal’ cosmetic appearance affects 338 
willingness to purchase in the former (Loebnitz et al., 2015). Within developed countries, 339 
a pro-environmental self-identity may also positively influence willingness to purchase 340 
‘wonky’ veg (Loebnitz et al., 2015). The range of these findings suggests beliefs of what 341 
consumers will accept is too narrow, resulting in unnecessary food loss at the production 342 
phase by prohibiting ‘ugly’ produce from entering food supply chain. 343 
The application of retailer’s private standards at the farm level influences production and 344 
distribution practices. Selective harvesting is an integral component of fresh fruit and 345 
vegetable production, with pickers trained to take only the produce that will meet 346 
retailer’s standards for sale (Gunders, 2012, p. 8). Potential edible-quality yield may be 347 
greater than that actually harvested, but the extra costs from picking fruit that doesn’t 348 
meet expected aesthetic standards and will thus be rejected at the next stage in the agri-349 
food chain would drive down economic yield. For the proportion that would not meet 350 
standards and thus be left in the field, creative marketing/processing/distribution of 351 
such produce could reduce avoidable on-farm loss, potentially increasing farm income 352 
and food availability (Stuart, 2009, p. 102). For example, processing ‘misshapen’ carrots 353 
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into ‘baby’ carrots can eliminate virtually all food waste associated with this vegetable 354 
(Peterson, 2008). Additionally, some charities and volunteer organisations, such as the 355 
St. Andrews Society in the U.S. and Feedback in Europe, engage with the farming 356 
community to collect produce that would be rejected by supermarkets for re-distribution 357 
(Feedback, 2018; SoSA, 2018). The prices obtained, and thus economic margins, of such 358 
out-graded produce may be lower than that of the highest classification (Roels and van 359 
Gijseghem, 2017), but provided they at least cover the cost of harvest, then it is 360 
worthwhile for the farmer to do so. If not, then the rational economic decision is to ‘walk-361 
by’ such produce – leave it in the field and plough it under as preparation for the next 362 
cycle. 363 
It is not in the farmer’s interest to have ‘quality’ standards based upon appearance that 364 
results in produce not being harvested and sold if such produce is safe to eat. Such 365 
standards differentiate produce of the same variety, with higher classifications achieving 366 
a higher selling price in normal conditions, but can result in substantial levels of on-farm 367 
loss pre- and post-harvest (Garnett, 2006, p. 63). Gunders (2012, p. 8) provides several 368 
individual examples of losses for different produce (cucumbers, citrus, tomatoes, stone 369 
fruit) regularly reaching or exceeding 50% in a season. 370 
Labelling of fresh produce is another manifestation of private standards and the 371 
demonstrates the power of supermarkets in defining a message. The use of devices that 372 
permit a ‘flexible best-before date’ have been successful in reducing loss between 373 
processor and distributor (Dobon et al., 2011). However, consumers commonly 374 
misinterpret ‘quality’ labels, such as “best before” and “sell-by”, as indicative of safety, 375 
leading to avoidable waste as food is discarded whilst still safely edible (Lebersorger and 376 
Schneider, 2014).  Dynamic pricing – reducing the price of produce approaching it’s ‘best 377 
before’ – can increase purchase activity by the consumer and reduce supermarket waste 378 
(Aschemann-Witzel et al., 2016). The potential downside to such a marketing strategy is 379 
increased food waste by households if consumption patterns are not adjusted (Brook 380 
Lyndhurst and WRAP, 2012). Better ‘food knowledge’ on behalf of the consumer – 381 
knowledge that is built up over time through exposure to food and its uses (which is being 382 
lost in developed countries as we are ever more removed from the food chain) – could 383 
result in greater acceptability of a greater range of cosmetic appearance. 384 
3.3 Waste perpetuated by the structural power of large supermarkets 385 
The food supply chain in many EU countries has undergone such consolidation that it can 386 
be considered an oligopoly. For example, at the end of 2017, the five largest chain food 387 
retailers (‘multiples’) had over 75% of the market share in each of the UK, France, and 388 
Ireland (KANTAR WorldPanel, 2018). This concentration is a marked change from the 389 
early post-WWII years, where multiples in the UK had a market share of 30% (Harvey, 390 
2007, p. 55). Whilst the number of institutional buyers has fallen through this 391 
consolidation, the supply-side of the relationship has not undergone a similar 392 
transformation. The relative imbalance in scarcity – there is far more competition for 393 
sellers – leads to greater power being held by the retailers as buyers (Cox and Chicksand, 394 
2007, p. 83).  395 
In addition to horizontal market consolidation of food retailing, some multiples have also 396 
consolidated vertically, taking a controlling interest in upstream production (Simons and 397 
Skydmore, 2017). Supermarkets exert their buyer power by imposing ‘voluntary private 398 
standards’ of cosmetic specifications for fresh produce (Henson & Humphrey, 2010). The 399 
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power exerted by the structure of the market – many suppliers for few retailers – acts as 400 
extra-governmental regulatory reach by the supermarket multiples. Private rules may be 401 
used to enhance or maintain a retailer’s reputation as well as managing suppliers 402 
(Fulponi, 2006). They are codified within business relationships of the more powerful 403 
party and often form part of contractual terms and conditions (Rindt and Mouzas, 2015). 404 
This power structure limits producers’ ability to influence the imposition of ‘quality 405 
standards’ (Gille, 2012). Such standards lead to avoidable food loss at the farm-level 406 
(Devin and Richards, 2016).  407 
The oligopolistic nature of many developed countries’ agri-food chains effectively make 408 
supplier compliance of ‘private’ standards mandatory (Davey and Richards, 2013). The 409 
more asymmetric the relationship between multiples and their suppliers, the more likely 410 
the dominant party will be able to exercise power over the weaker. Within the agri-food 411 
chain, this has manifested itself in the proliferation of ‘private standards’ by the 412 
supermarkets (Rindt and Mouzas, 2015). These private rules ‘normalise’ and auto-413 
reinforce what is otherwise an imbalanced relationship, shifting risk onto the weaker 414 
party (i.e. the supplier) via an ‘intervention-enforcement-sanctioning’ feedback loop 415 
(Rindt and Mouzas, 2015). The consolidation of supermarket multiples within the agri-416 
food chain has led to a virtual vertical integration with fewer suppliers and a 417 
strengthening of power of those multiples (Hingley, 2005). By coming together as a 418 
cohesive group acting in concert (promoted as ‘producer organisations’ by the EU in 419 
recognition of supplier-retailer imbalance as a potential driver of food waste (European 420 
Court Auditors, 2016, p. 52); suppliers could shift the power relationship towards a 421 
balance with retailers (Maglaras et al., 2015). 422 
3.4 Waste perpetuated by the consumer’s learned experience 423 
What produce should ‘typically’ look like guides purchase intentions – consumers are 424 
more likely to purchase something that is familiar and recognisable (Gigerenzer and 425 
Gaissmaier, 2011). Consumers use simple learned heuristics of visual appearance to 426 
make food selection rather than the time-consuming process of comparing large amounts 427 
of data (Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al., 2013). Consumers’ lack of experience of abnormally 428 
shaped food leads them to view such produce as more risky and less natural than produce 429 
that conforms to supermarket standards (Loebnitz and Grunert, 2018). Although 430 
moderate differentiation/incongruity of produce may increase the attention paid to that 431 
product by a consumer (e.g. a new variety of familiar produce), there is a counteracting 432 
social risk of being linked with food whose appearance is atypical (Campbell and 433 
Goodstein, 2001). Visual perception and setting influences consumers’ expectation of 434 
taste experience; they are less willing to purchase cosmetically ‘sub-optimal’ fruit than 435 
consume it in the home (Symmank et al., 2018). Consumers appear to apply a ‘beauty 436 
mystique’ – a sociological concept to judgement where goodness is beauty and beauty is 437 
goodness (Synnott, 1989) – to fresh produce. Being exposed to broader parameters of 438 
‘normal’ during the learning phase could lead to an acceptance of ‘sub-optimal’ food. 439 
Heuristics are well-entrenched, though may interact with each other. Knowledge of 440 
origins of food (e.g. organic or not) and acceptance of abnormally-shaped food may be 441 
inversely related (Loebnitz and Grunert, 2018). The ‘blender effect’ of Szocs and Lefebvre 442 
(2016) – greater ‘processing’ is required in the home to achieve acceptable palatability -  443 
may reduce likelihood of purchase. Labelling of visually sub-optimal produce that 444 
reinforces its taste may have more influence on the purchase decision of ‘ugly’ food than 445 
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price discounts relative to optimal produce (Helmert et al., 2017). Loss aversion – e.g. 446 
avoiding throwing away ‘good money’ by binning uneaten produce – is a powerful 447 
modifier of behaviour (Moseley and Stoker, 2013). Unintentional or unconscious 448 
decisions may result in actions by consumer waste activity not otherwise aligned with 449 
their attitudes, referred to as the ‘squander sequence’ by Block et al. (2016). Wasteful 450 
behaviour or attitudes may not be universally held, even within a given culture. Over 65s 451 
in the UK exhibit behaviours that typically lead to less food waste relative to younger 452 
consumers. For the last generation to have experienced government food rationing 453 
‘wastefulness’ in general is ‘just wrong’ (Quested et al., 2013). Consumers are key to 454 
sustainable food choices, and those choices can influence upstream efficiency, leading to 455 
more or less food loss and waste along the food supply chain. 456 
4. Learning opportunities case study 457 
In this section, we use a case study as a small-scale illustration of what may be possible, 458 
in a UK context, to address food loss and waste of ‘ugly’ produce from the endemic drivers 459 
discussed in Section 3 previously. Specifically, we are concerned with avoidable food loss 460 
at the farm-level as a function of aesthetics, a key aspect of quality within the food 461 
industry and regulatory bodies. Care was taken in choosing a case atypical to the status 462 
quo UK agri-food supply chain. Conclusions drawn may not be generalisable to other 463 
fresh produce or farming operations, particularly for farms and distribution that are 464 
much larger in scale and with more complex supply chains. As a single case study, it 465 
should be viewed as explorative rather than definitive; a potential precursor to inform 466 
larger scale investigations. However, whilst the case’s operations may not be fully 467 
applicable to industrial food producers, removing the real or perceived need to abide by 468 
cosmetic standards unrelated to food safety could see significant cuts to food losses. This 469 
section is intended to spark discussion and review of policy, custom, and behaviour to 470 
improve efficiency across the food system. 471 
4.1 Illustrative atypical case study: Description of case and data collection methods 472 
A medium-sized farm (c. 500 acres) in the Central Belt of Scotland was selected as the 473 
case study, with strawberry production as the unit of interest. The farm has been run 474 
under a perpetual lease by the same family for three generations, with the current 475 
generation in place for over 15 years. The farm uses standard production techniques for 476 
Scotland, such as raised coir-beds within covered poly-tunnels. This protects the crop, 477 
increases the length of the growing season, and eases the effort to harvest. 478 
The case-study farm’s changes to its business model allows an examination of each of the 479 
four drivers cosmetics-related loss identified in the previous section. Losses from other 480 
food supply stages inherent in more complex supply chains – specifically storage, 481 
handling, process, and transport to distribution centres – are excluded here for 482 
comparability. The farm had previously operated within a typical environment of 483 
supplying to supermarket multiples. Dissatisfaction on multiple levels led the owner to 484 
completely change to an atypical model. For the past 10 years, the food supply chain of 485 
this case study is the shortest possible – direct from farmer to final consumer. There are 486 
no other agents in the chain (i.e. no packers, distributors, retail supermarket multiples, 487 
or other ‘middlemen’). The farm thus has complete control over what it sells to 488 
consumers, and when, including the level of grade-outs due solely to aesthetic reasons. 489 
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A mix of qualitative and quantitative data collection methods were employed. These 490 
included extensive interviews conducted over several months with the farm’s owner and 491 
general manager, and direct measurements of produce. As part of the case-study, we 492 
sought to generate a rough estimate of avoidable aesthetics-related losses in UK-wide 493 
strawberry production and their embedded production-phase GHG emissions (Eq 4). We 494 
use the term ‘avoidable loss’ as there are no health-based reasons for the fruit to not enter 495 
the supply chain; it remains safely edible. Supermarket multiples in the UK are now 496 
selling some proportion of non-Class I (i.e. ‘sub-optimal’) fruit and vegetables as ‘ugly’, 497 
‘imperfect’, or ‘wonky’ – a relatively recent occurrence within the UK. This is taken into 498 
account in our estimates of avoidable loss in Table 2 as the variable SuboptimalSupermarket. 499 
Based upon our interviews, the typical supply chain has no other economic use for out-500 
graded fruit (i.e. that proportion of fruit not meeting Class I criteria); it is composted on-501 
site by the producer, thereby being lost to the FSC. 502 
The percentage of SuboptimalFarm fruit was estimated from strawberry produce offered 503 
for sale at the case-study farm. On six days over the course of a 15-day period in the 504 
latter half of June 2017 (peak season), we collected a random sample of 10% of punnets 505 
for sale in the farm shop. Under the guidance of the farm owner, we applied EU quality 506 
standards to categorise each berry in the sampled punnets into Class I and non-Class I, 507 
which we then weighed separately. As a proxy for variable SuboptimalSupermarket, we took 508 
direct measurements of shelf linear feet allocated to Class I and Class II strawberries by 509 
a national supermarket chain on the same days as we collected the farm samples. 510 
Harvesttotal is the five-year average of the UK strawberry harvest for 2012-16 (Defra, 511 
2016). Finally, we applied the UK-specific EF for strawberries from  512 
Table 1 to estimate embedded production-phase GHG emissions of the avoidable loss 513 
(EmAvoidable). 514 
 515 
Eq 4 516 
𝐸𝑚𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  =  ((𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚 − 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡) ∗  𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙) ∗ 𝐸𝐹 517 
 518 
4.2 Overcoming waste encouraged by market standards/regulations 519 
The case-study farming business uses a more holistic definition of quality than EU 520 
marketing standards or retail multiples whilst retaining a quality-control/quality-521 
assurance effort. By selling direct to consumers, the specific EU-level marketing 522 
standards on the appearance of the fruit for grading into official Classes needn’t be 523 
applied. Therefore, the farm shop has greater flexibility to decide what is suitable for sale 524 
to its customers. However, interviews with the farm owner and manager indicate that 525 
those fruit selected for the farm shop are the best quality available on the plants each day.  526 
“Would you be happy paying for and eating that strawberry yourself? We 527 
don't mind if there's some misshapen fruit that goes in there or anything 528 
like that. Basically, if you're happy to eat it yourself then it’s a Class I fruit 529 
for us.” (Owner) 530 
Fruit for the farm shop is sold at a price premium relative to supermarkets as ‘picked 531 
fresh’  yet avoidable waste on the case study farm is practically zero. This is due to 532 
flexibility in decisions of what fruit is sold and how, by not being beholden to EU 533 
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classifications. The case study farm has invested in infrastructure such as an industrial 534 
kitchen and farm café to be able to use what fresh produce is left unsold at the end of the 535 
day in the farm shop. It is processed on-site into other products, such as jams, or 536 
otherwise used in the café. Fruit that is unsafe for consumption – the unavoidable losses 537 
– is composted on-site. This proportion was estimated by the farm owner at less than 1% 538 
of annual harvest yield, though is not systematically recorded. 539 
4.3 Avoiding waste encouraged by retailers’ cosmetic standards 540 
The case-study farm is both producer and retailer – produce grown on site is sold only on 541 
site. The have full control over what and how produce is presented to customers of the 542 
farm shop, which differs from EU or the more strict supermarket classification standards. 543 
For example, whilst colouration is an aspect of visual appearance taken into 544 
consideration during the selection decision of fruit for the farm shop, size and shape are 545 
not. This approach is in direct contrast to industry ‘quality’ standards. 546 
“Our spec, it's very loose. It's very rare that I go in and reject any fruit. The 547 
basic requirement is that it's picked that day, and that it looks appealing 548 
to eat”. (Owner) 549 
The mean proportion of ‘ugly’, or non-Class I, fruit from farm shop punnet samples was 550 
19%, with a median of 23%, and ranged from 0 to 27%, dependent upon sample. There 551 
was one outlier with a measure of zero non-Class I fruit. If this single data-point were 552 
excluded – it is more than two standard deviations from the nearest – the minimum 553 
proportion of ‘uglies’ rises to 14%, the mean matches the median at 23%, and standard 554 
error contracts to 1.9% from 3.8%. The average proportion of retail space allocated to 555 
non-Class I strawberries in the supermarket sample was 12%, just over half the 556 
proportion measured from the case study farm (Table 2). This suggests actual FLW at 557 
farms supplying the large retail multiples may be about 10%, similar to the value in Table 558 
2 of 12%.  559 
Annual UK strawberry production in the five years to 2016 averaged 102,000 t (Defra, 560 
2016), of which roughly a quarter (25,300 t) was produced in Scotland (Scottish 561 
Government, 2017). Scaling up the difference in non-Class I fruit sold via supermarkets 562 
and that produced by our case study farm to the whole of the UK, we estimate 563 
approximately 10,000 t of strawberries may be lost from the FSC due to aesthetic 564 
standards. This estimated loss has the equivalent of 8000 t CO2e of embedded emissions. 565 
It must be noted that these estimates are very preliminary, and are presented as only 566 
potentially indicative of the avoidable loss due to cosmetics. Broader and deeper 567 
investigation of the full supply chain for strawberries and other produce in the UK is 568 
needed. 569 
  570 
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 571 
 Sub-optimal Fruit (%) 
 Case-study Farm Supermarket 
Mean 23 12 
Median 23 10 
Standard Error 1.9 3.4 
Maximum 27 24 
Minimum 14 6 
Table 2. Proportion of 'ugly' fruit sold through different distribution channels. The case-study farm values in this table 572 
exclude a single outlier of 0%. Including that data point into the set reduces the mean to 19% and increases the 573 
standard error to 3.8%. There were no outliers in the supermarket data. 574 
4.4 Reducing waste encouraged by the structural power of supermarkets 575 
Our case study interviewees clearly communicated the lack of power they had with 576 
respect to selling their produce to retail multiples under the previous business model. 577 
From their perspective, the supermarkets ‘held all the cards’. At times the participants 578 
discarded entire harvests by ploughing under, or even not harvested at all, where the cost 579 
of harvesting was more than the price being offered by supermarkets for the produce. 580 
Costs to grow the produce would still be incurred, but further losses to harvest and ‘sell’ 581 
it would be avoided – a practice they felt was anathema to farming.  582 
Farmers are expected to honour production contracts or risk being dropped. If short of 583 
produce, a farmer must source it wherever possible and absorb the cost of doing so. 584 
Selling direct to customer puts at least some of that power back into the hands of the 585 
farmer – they have full decision-making power over what they offer for sale to the 586 
customer. It is not necessary to strictly comply with the EU marketing standards. At the 587 
same time, selling direct also exposes the farmer to different risks; they take full 588 
responsibility for marketing their produce. Selling produce that lacks value for money 589 
could quickly have a negative feedback effect, particularly if it is already selling at a 590 
premium to a similar supermarket offering. 591 
“I've got 100% control over what we do. If I make a good job of marketing 592 
and get customers in to buy the products, then I get a high return. If I make 593 
a bad job, then I get a low return. To me that's what gets me up in the 594 
morning; it's having control over your own destiny, which you don't have 595 
if you're doing it the other ways.” (Owner) 596 
5. Conclusion 597 
We have argued there are likely to be several drivers of avoidable loss of ‘ugly’ food, 598 
involving multiple actors within the food supply chain. These include: regulations that 599 
incorporate purely cosmetic elements at national and supranational levels; private 600 
‘voluntary’ grading criteria by retail multiples; power differential between farmer and 601 
retailer; and, learned expectations of consumers. Via our atypical case study, we suggest 602 
it may be possible for some actors to overcome these drivers, generating multiple 603 
benefits. Less discard of safe, edible food for aesthetic reasons could help reduce food 604 
insecurity. Less avoidable food loss would also lower the climate cost and increase 605 
agriculture’s GHG-efficiency, in terms of embedded GHG emissions, by needing to 606 
produce less food. An efficient food supply chain, where food loss and waste are 607 
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minimised within and between the various stages, could increase food availability 608 
without the need for producing more.  609 
The use of fresh fruit and vegetable produce that would otherwise be lost or wasted 610 
requires alternative routes that are available to farmers, and provide a sufficient price to 611 
make it economical to do anything other than plough-in or walk-by an out-of-612 
specification harvest. Entrepreneurs have launched new businesses aimed at both 613 
consumers and producers, with the aim of using more of food that is produced (e.g. Olio, 614 
Imperfect Produce, FoodCloud, etc.). A law passed unanimously by both French 615 
legislative Houses in late 2015 aims to empower all actors within the food supply chain 616 
to eliminate avoidable food waste, emphasising efforts to maintain its use as food for 617 
human consumption (French Senate, 2015). In contrast to France, a food waste reduction 618 
private member’s bill, also targeting supermarkets, first tabled in the UK Parliament in 619 
late 2015 remains mired at the first stage of the process (McCarthy, 2016). Positively 620 
however, all major supermarkets in the UK publicly support the voluntary Courtauld 621 
2025 Commitment of 20% reduction of food waste by 2025 (WRAP n.d.). Further, some 622 
supermarkets have seen this as a marketing opportunity, with new branding for fruit and 623 
vegetables that would have previously fallen short of their aesthetic/quality criteria (e.g. 624 
Asda’s ‘Wonky Veg’ and Tesco’s ‘Perfectly Imperfect’). This could reduce avoidable food 625 
loss at source, generating benefits for the climate through reduced emissions from waste. 626 
Other co-benefits, such as less food poverty, and greater stability of farm income, may 627 
also be obtained. 628 
A changing political climate within the UK also looms large on the horizon for the 629 
agriculture industry. The details and domestic policy implications of the UK’s expected 630 
exit in 2019 from the European Union (or ‘Brexit’) remain unknown. Brexit may offer the 631 
UK the opportunity to develop and apply policy options for domestically-consumed FFV 632 
that current EU regulations may not permit, such as banning the use of cosmetic 633 
characteristics as factors in determining ‘quality’. However it is far from certain the UK 634 
government would adopt such a policy, especially if they choose to keep open the 635 
prospects of trade with EU countries. Moreover the UK government has not taken other 636 
measures available to it as an EU member (or where membership should not inhibit 637 
action), such as: educational initiatives to increase knowledge and familiarity of food 638 
produce; and, revisit labelling of foods to provide consumers with clear information they 639 
can use in their decision-making process. The potential impact of policy on food loss 640 
warrants further research, building upon that begun by the EU FUSIONS project (EU 641 
FUSIONS, 2015). 642 
Much research continues to be focused at the consumer end of the food supply chain in 643 
Europe (e.g.: De Laurentiis et al. (2018) on quantification; Gaiani et al. (2018) on 644 
attitudes; von Kameke and Fischer (2018) on behaviour change; Aschemann-Witzel et al. 645 
(2017a) on success factors). However, there remain considerable levels of uncertainty in 646 
many aspects of estimating food loss and waste in early FSC stages and its embedded 647 
climate impact. Here, we have attempted to provide some measure of additional clarity 648 
on such wastage. Our specific perspective has been one of viewing avoidable loss as a 649 
function of arbitrary quality standards. The case study we used focused only upon one 650 
crop – strawberries – grown and sold in the UK. The estimates presented with respect to 651 
the UK strawberry industry are very rough, based on this small-scale pilot, and are meant 652 
to be illustrative of possible climate cost due to application of cosmetic standards to fresh 653 
produce. Without generalising from a single specific case, our conclusion is there are very 654 
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likely to be substantial avoidable losses, yet also a great deal of uncertainty of the 655 
quantity. Larger-scale investigations to generate a more robust quantification of food loss 656 
at the farm stage, from all drivers, is necessary. A clearer picture of the scale and nature 657 
of the issue is also needed, recognising that different food crops in different geographic 658 
and social contexts may have different issues. 659 
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